

deny international access to related facilities in accordance with international non-proliferation agreements.

*Section 513. Sense of Congress on Third Option Foundation*

Section 513 expresses the sense of Congress that the Third Option Foundation's work on behalf of the CIA's special operations community and their families is invaluable, such that the Director of the CIA should work with the Foundation to implement section 6412 of the *Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020*, which provided special rules for certain monthly workers' compensation payments and other payments to CIA personnel.

COMMITTEE COMMENTS

*Equitable Treatment of Relocation Costs for Intelligence Community Civilians*

As demonstrated in The Intelligence Community Workforce Agility Protection Act of 2020, S. 3675, introduced by Senators Burr and Warner, the Committee strongly supports IC personnel who must make a permanent change of station to accept an IC position. The Committee recognizes such relocations pose significant financial hardships for the IC civilians who move their families to serve their country. Current law provides military members with exemptions from effective tax penalties for such relocations, but IC civilians have no similar exemptions, thus undermining the IC's ability to recruit and maintain a highly qualified and motivated workforce. The Intelligence Community Workforce Agility Protection Act of 2020 would provide equitable tax treatment for IC civilians who are subject to similar permanent change of station orders. The Committee looks forward to expeditious congressional action on this matter.

*Advanced Aerial Threats*

The Committee supports the efforts of the Unidentified Aerial Phenomenon Task Force at the Office of Naval Intelligence to standardize collection and reporting on unidentified aerial phenomenon, any links they have to adversarial foreign governments, and the threat they pose to U.S. military assets and installations. However, the Committee remains concerned that there is no unified, comprehensive process within the Federal Government for collecting and analyzing intelligence on unidentified aerial phenomena, despite the potential threat. The Committee understands that the relevant intelligence may be sensitive; nevertheless, the Committee finds that the information sharing and coordination across the Intelligence Community has been inconsistent, and this issue has lacked attention from senior leaders.

Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the heads of such other agencies as the Director and Secretary jointly consider relevant, to submit a report within 180 days of the date of enactment of the Act, to the congressional intelligence and armed services committees on unidentified aerial phenomena (also known as "anomalous aerial vehicles"), including observed airborne objects that have not been identified.

The Committee further directs the report to include:

1. A detailed analysis of unidentified aerial phenomena data and intelligence reporting collected or held by the Office of Naval Intelligence, including data and intelligence reporting held by the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force;
2. A detailed analysis of unidentified phenomena data collected by:
  - a. geospatial intelligence;
  - b. signals intelligence;
  - c. human intelligence; and
  - d. measurement and signals intelligence;
3. A detailed analysis of data of the FBI, which was derived from investigations of intrusions of unidentified aerial phenomena data over restricted United States airspace;
4. A detailed description of an interagency process for ensuring timely data collection and centralized analysis of all unidentified aerial phenomena reporting for the Federal Government, regardless of which service or agency acquired the information;
5. Identification of an official accountable for the process described in paragraph 4;
6. Identification of potential aerospace or other threats posed by the unidentified aerial phenomena to national security, and an assessment of whether this unidentified aerial phenomena activity may be attributed to one or more foreign adversaries;
7. Identification of any incidents or patterns that indicate a potential adversary may have achieved breakthrough aerospace capabilities that could put United States strategic or conventional forces at risk; and
8. Recommendations regarding increased collection of data, enhanced research and development, and additional funding and other resources.

The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

*Coordination of Security for Domestic Military Installations and Other Facilities*

The Committee is concerned that, as a result of several recent incidents of attempted unauthorized access to Naval Air Station Key West and Fort Story, Virginia by Chinese nationals, several security vulnerabilities have been discovered. Foreign adversaries may be systematically probing military installations and facilities, and it is important that the Department of Defense take responsibility for ensuring security measures are adequate, unauthorized accesses are tracked, and uniform reporting requirements for attempted unauthorized accesses are established.

Therefore, the Committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)), in coordination with the DNI and the Director of the FBI, to establish within the Office of the USD(I&S) a designee responsible for coordination of security for domestic military installations and other domestic military facilities. Specifically, the designee's responsibilities shall include tracking unauthorized incursions into domestic military installations and facilities and attempts at such incursions.